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 Abstract  
  
Machine learning techniques are immensely deployed in both industry and academy. Recent studies 
indicate that machine learning models used for classification tasks are vulnerable to adversarial 
examples, which limits the usage of applications in the fields with high precision requirements. We 
propose a new approach called Feature Map Denoising to detect the adversarial inputs and show 
the performance of detection on the mixed dataset consisting of adversarial examples generated by 
different attack algorithms, which can be used to associate with any pre-trained DNNs at a low cost. 
Wiener filter is also introduced as the denoise algorithm to the defense model, which can further 
improve performance. Experimental results indicate that good accuracy of detecting the adversarial 
examples can be achieved through our Feature Map Denoising algorithm. 
  
 I.  Introduction  
  
Machine learning (ML) techniques are immensely employed in both industry and 
academy, achieving excellent performance on tasks such as classification, natural language 
processing, auto-driving, etc. Image classification, as one of the most popular domains, can be 
applied to many fields. The assumption underneath the image classification models is that 
training dataset share the indistinguishable data distribution with the testing dataset so that the 
learned features can be used to predict later. The consistency, however, can be broken by 
poisoning the training/testing dataset. Those poisoned examples, which are called adversarial 
examples, are generated by adding tiny perturbation into legitimate image in pixel value. An 
adversarial image usually is imperceptible for human at image level. The deviation between 
legitimate examples and adversarial examples will lower the performance of ML models. 
Samuel et al. [3] introduce real-world security issues related to the health information machine 
learning system with the intent of insurance claims approval. And Samuel suggests that 
defenses have to secure against all possible present and future attacks. 
Several defense techniques [2] are proposed to mitigate the security issues caused by 
the “modified” examples. Some of the previous works aim to harden the ML models to be 
robust to the adversarial examples so that they can ensure the performance of the models 
(Section II), such as adversarial training and gradient masking. For adversarial training, it 
suffers from the costly model retraining. Apart from the expensive training cost, it also needs 
numerous adversarial examples which need to be generated for training. Gradient masking 
defense reduces the sensitivity of the model to small perturbation. Nevertheless, the less 
sensitive the model is, the less accuracy the model will have on predicting the legitimate 
images. A few other studies detect adversarial examples and leave the DNNs unchanged to 
avoid the high cost in the training stage (Section II). The reactive defense models can be used 
on distinct DNNs.   
 In this paper, we propose Feature Map Denoising defense that differentiates legitimate 
inputs and adversarial inputs generated by Fast Gradient Sign Method and Basic Iterative 
Method attack algorithms on ImageNet dataset. The underlying approach behind Feature Map 
Denoising is to compare the feature map of a given input, which can be represented by the 
prediction probability of the DNNs, with the feature map of the input after applying denoise 
techniques. In other words, the denoise method has different extents of effect on legitimate 
inputs and adversarial inputs. The degree of effects can be quantified by the distance between 
the prediction vectors of the denoised image and original one.  
 
Contribution  
  
In this work, we introduce a new method named Feature Map Denoising for detecting 
the adversarial examples, which can be used to associate with any pre-trained DNNs. Most of 
the previous studies perform the defense models on MNIST and CIFAR dataset, and the 
performance of the models will decrease when applied on more complex datasets. 1.We 
challenge to detect the adversarial inputs on one of the most complicated datasets, ImageNet. 
2. To denoise the feature map, we apply the wiener filter, which is used to get involved as part 
of the defense model for the first time. 3. Our model can achieve a 67% overall detection rate 
of adversarial inputs generated by FGSM and BIM, which have even larger perturbation, on 
the ImageNet datasets.  
 
 II.  Related Works  
  
In this section, we investigate and summarize the related works that connect with our 
problem.   
Christian et al. [9] propose adversarial training to optimize the problem of the 
adversarial negatives. Adversarial examples with the ground-truth labels are added into the 
training dataset, so that the DNNs can learn the features of adversarial examples to predict 
correctly. Florian et al. [10] propose ensembled adversarial training. A larger scale of 
adversarial examples generated from multiple attack algorithms are used in the training stage. 
The methodology corporates the perturbation features which transfer from the holdout models 
to increase the robustness of the DNNs. However, generally, the adversarial learning needs the 
model to be trained on specific perturbation to gain robustness. The high cost of generating 
large scale of the adversarial datasets and retraining the model, especially on complicated 
models and datasets, is the weakness. Moreover, the precondition of training on the adversarial 
datasets is the attack algorithms should be known, which is not usually same in the real-world 
cases. 
Papernot et al. [8] introduce the defense distillation to solve the security problems 
related to DNNs. The distilled knowledge extracted from DNNs transfers back to itself, which 
benefits from additional information encoded in class probabilities. In other words, the data 
distribution of the adversarial examples could be represented by the prediction vectors in 
another form, which can be used as distilled knowledge to be learnt by the DNNs. The model 
encapsulates distilled knowledge for the purpose of reducing the sensitivity, which can avoid 
the wrong output induced by small perturbation. However, the significant perturbation can be 
hardly defended by reducing the sensitivity, and the less sensitive the model is, the lower 
accuracy the model will has. 
Xu et al. [13] propose feature squeezing to mitigate the security issues caused by 
malicious inputs. Instead of modifying the structure of the DNNs to increase the robustness, 
Xu’s approach reduces the dimensions of the feature spaces of the inputs and leaves the DNNs 
unchanged. The intuitive reasoning is that unnecessary input spaces increase the chance of 
generating the perturbation that will confuse the prediction. The distance between the 
prediction vectors of the original input and squeezed input is calculated to be used as metrics 
to filter the malicious data. The threshold is selected to filter out the adversarial inputs linearly. 
The encouraging result shows on an even more complicated dataset, like ImageNet. However, 
the feature squeezing does not achieve ideal detection accuracy on some attacks with larger 
perturbation.  
  
III. Methods  
  
A. Fast Gradient Sign Method  
  
Fast Gradient Signed Method is an algorithm described by Goodfellow et al. [4], which 
computes the perturbation to add on by utilizing the sign of the gradient of the objective 
function in aim to increase the loss of the DNNs. The formula can be expressed as:  
X’ =X + e ∗ sign (∇𝐽x (X, 𝑦, θ))  
where e is the magnitude of perturbation, and 𝐽 (X, 𝑦, θ) represents the loss of the neural 
network. The FGSM algorithm has significant superiority of computation time, and limits each 
pixel was changed up to the magnitude.  
  
B. Basic iteration method  
  
Kurakin et al. [7] propose an extension attack algorithm, which applys the loss 
amplification in multiple iterations with small steps and limits the pixels change up to the e by 
clipping the intermediate result. The computation cost depends on the selection of the iterations. 
The direction of adding on pixel noises are transformed dynamically. The formula can be 
expressed as:   
  
X 0’ = X, X N+1’ = ClipX, e {X N’ +esign (∇𝐽x (X N’, 𝑦))}  
  
C. Medium filter  
  
The medium filter is one of the smoothing functions, in which to smooth the pixels by 
replacing the values of the neighbors. The sliding window runs over all signals and replaces 
each pixel by the median of its contiguous values within the window. The size of sliding 
window is the parameter and can be adjusted. The size of the window is positively related to 
the smoothness. 
We run the medium filter on the images chosen from ImageNet, shown in Figure 1. The 
magnitude of the sliding windows is 3, which means every 3 x 3 window will be replaced by 
the median over 9 pixels. The usage of medium filter to denoise the feature maps intuitively 
decreases the effect of perturbation by smoothing the pixels, which drop the potential for DNNs 
to catch the adversarial pixels to alter the prediction. We assume that the difference between 
the prediction vector in the clean image and the denoised clean image is distinguishable from 
the difference of the adversarial image and the denoised adversarial images. 
 
D. Wiener filter  
  
Norbert Wiener proposed wiener filter during the 1940s to mitigate the noise issue in 
the signals and the wiener filter has a good performance on noise reduction for several format 
of noises. The intention of the wiener filter is to find a filter g to estimate 𝑥̂ which minimize 
the mean square error with the unknown true 𝑥̂, the formula of wiener filter for denoising 2D 
signal is:  
  
𝑥̂ (𝑚, 𝑛) = [
𝐻∗(𝑚,𝑛)
|𝐻(𝑚,𝑛)|2+𝐾
]𝑦(𝑚, 𝑛) 
where 𝑦 (𝑛, 𝑚) is the observed image and consists of true 𝑥̂ and unknown noise, 𝐻 (𝑚, 𝑛) 
represents the degradation function, 𝐻∗ (𝑚, 𝑛) represents the complex conjugate of 𝐻 (𝑚, 𝑛), and 
K is constant. The mean square error is:  
  
𝐸 = 𝐸|𝑥̂ (𝑚, 𝑛) − 𝑥̂ (𝑚, 𝑛) |2  
  
The images were transformed to grayscale since only two-dimensional wiener filter was 
formulated. And we run the wiener filter on the images chosen from ImageNet, and the 
examples shown in Figure 2.  
  
  
  
Figure 1: Medium Filter applied on legitimate images and adversarial images generated by FGSM 
attack algorithm. Adversarial images and denoised adversarial images shown in the first two rows; 
legitimate images and denoised legitimate images shown in the last two rows.  
 
 
E. ML classifiers  
  
K Nearest Neighbor is a machine learning algorithm that takes the distance similarity 
as the measurement. During the training stage, the classifier stores all the available cases and 
corresponding labels. The test data are classified based on the similarity between data and 
previous training examples. In these experiments, the hyperparameter tuning was used and the 
K with the best detection accuracy during the training stage was selected.  
The decision tree is a flowchart-like structure, as well as one of the supervised machine 
learning algorithms. Every node in the decision tree represents a specific test on single feature; 
every leaf node represents a class label, which is the decision made from the feature test. The 
strategy of the model is to split a dataset based on different conditions through both 
classification and regression tasks. The random forest classifier consists of multiple decision 
trees, which preserves the correct direction from the individual errors. The random forest 
performs better on the prediction that single tree has low correlation from others.  
Support Vector Machine is a supervised learning algorithm, which is based on the idea 
of finding a hyperplane that separates the dataset into different domains. The kernel used in 
SVM is a way to map the original dataset into a high dimensional space to find the separator. 
Radial Basis Function is the kernel function used in the experiment.  
  
  
Figure 2: Winer Filter applied on legitimate images and adversarial images generated by BIM attack 
algorithm after transforming the images to grayscale. Adversarial images and denoised adversarial images 
shown in the first two rows; legitimate images and denoised legitimate images shown in the last two rows.  
 
 
IV. Experiments  
  
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the Feature Map Denoising method to 
filter out the malicious inputs. We first test on adversarial examples generated by FGSM and 
BIM attack algorithms separately. Afterwards, we test on the mixed adversarial datasets to 
assess the performance of the defense model. 
  
Dataset   
  
ImageNet is a large-scale image dataset coordinated based on the WordNet hierarchy. With the 
development of the sophisticated algorithm on computer vision field, the ImageNet is inspired 
by the growing need of a uniform resource to test on. ImageNet contains over 20,000 synsets, 
and 1000 synsets with SIFT features. In this work, we randomly select the synsets and images 
in each synsets from 1000 classes with SIFT features.  
Pre-generated adversarial examples from Xu’s work [13]. Xu et al. select 100 images 
from ImageNet and apply the attack algorithms on to test the robustness. In our work, we use 
the same adversarial examples applied FGSM and BIM attack algorithms separately to test the 
performance of our model.  
  
Feature Map Denoise   
  
Medium filter and wiener filter are used to denoise the feature maps. We first test on the 
detection performance of the known attacks. Denoise method applies on the dataset which 
composed of the pre-generated adversarial images balanced with the legitimate images 
randomly selected from ImageNet separately. Then, we perform noise reduction on the dataset 
containing mixed adversarial images generated from two kinds of attack algorithms and clean 
images.  
  
Top-5 Confidence Prediction Scores   
  
The pre-trained MobileNet [5] predicts the original images and the denoise images separately. 
The output of the softmax layer which is one-dimensional prediction vector with the length of 
1000 is transformed to the two-dimensional prediction vector with the length of 5 which 
consists of the top-5 confidence class labels and corresponding confidence scores. The average 
of the L0 distance is computed between the top-5 confidence prediction vectors of the original 
image and denoise image, the formula of calculating the distance score is:  
𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒(𝑥̂) =
1
5
∗ ‖𝑃5(𝑥̂)⃗⃗⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗ − 𝑃5(𝑥̂′)⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ‖ 
  
where 𝑃5(𝑥̂)⃗⃗⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗  represent the top-5 confidence prediction vector of the original image, 𝑃5(𝑥̂′) 
represent the top-5 confidence prediction vector of the denoise image. (The distance is 
computed while the classes of the index are identical; if the class label does not exist in one of 
the vectors, the confidence score will set to be zero.  
 
  
ML classifiers   
  
In this stage, multiple machine learning classifiers are used to classify the labeled scores. The 
labeled score has the format (X, y) where X represents the score computed from the previous 
step, and y {1,0} represents adversarial or legitimate images.   
The dataset was separated with a ratio of 0.5. We first test on the known attack with the k 
nearest neighbor, random forest, and decision tree. The hyperparameter tuning is performed 
during the training time and the best hyperparameters are used in the test stage. Support vector 
machine is used to classify the labeled score acquired from the wiener filter as well. Then, we 
test on the hybrid datasets, the hyperparameter tuning performed and the best classifier selected 
during the training stage, which used to test the performance of the detection. The overall 
approach of the Feature Map Denoising method is depicted in Figure 3.  
  
  
Figure 3. The flowchart of the Feature Map Denoising method. 
  
  
 V.  Results  
  
The performance of the Feature Map Denoising defense is encouraging. The results of 
detection of the adversarial examples generated by single attack algorithms are shown in Table 
1. The best accuracy of detecting the adversarial examples generated by FGSM attack algorithm 
is 68% with the medium filter; and 74% accuracy on detecting the adversarial examples 
generated by the BIM attack with the wiener filter. For the adversarial inputs generated by 
multiple attack algorithms, which is closer to the real-world cases, 67% overall accuracy can 
be achieved by applying the wiener filter denoise method. The comparison and individual 
detection rates are shown in Table 2.   
 
 
 Medium Filter  Wiener Filter 
KNN DT RF  KNN DT RF SVM 
FGSM 0.56 0.68 0.62  0.36 0.5 0.54 0.66 
BIM 0.4 0.42 0.48  0.56 0.58 0.56 0.74 
  
Table 1. Result of adversarial examples detection rate of known attack algorithm.  
  
  Xu et al. [13]  Medium Filter  Wiener Filter 
FGSM  0.4444  0.60  0.66 
BIM  0.59  0.54  0.68 
 
Table 2. Result of adversarial examples detection rate of hybrid attack algorithm.  
  
  
VI. Discussion and Future Works  
  
In this work, we propose the Feature Map Denoising algorithm which detects the hidden 
malicious images to increase the robustness of the machine learning models; and this method 
can be associate with any pre-trained models. Wiener filter, for the first time to be used to get 
involved as part of the defense model, makes essential contribution to the detection of malicious 
examples. It is not surprising that the defense model with the wiener filter performs better since 
the wiener filter denoises the image by minimizing the mean square error, which makes it closer 
to the clean image, whereas the medium filter only smooths the data distribution. By smoothing 
the adversarial image, the noise will still remain as both FGSM and BIM modify all the pixels 
of the images. To summarize, the defense model achieves an overall pleasing result on the 
complex dataset. Compared to the previous works, this work is inexpensively deployed, and it 
is efficient on the detection of the adversarial examples generated by FGSM and BIM.   
Feature Map Denoising defense raises an early research on detecting the adversarial 
examples by classifying the distance scores between the probability vectors of the denoised and 
original input. To improve the current research, a wiener filter algorithm can be designed which 
can be applied on color images. While the approach provides pleasing results on defending 
some attack algorithms, it still needs to be extended to a universal scenario since unknown, 
mixed, and complicated attacks happen commonly in real-world cases. The ideal defense will 
secure against all possible present and future attacks. Moreover, 67% blended detection rate is 
encouraging but still not secure enough for some fields, like medical system. We plan to 
understand our prediction better through rule generation [6] and use other machine learning 
technologies such as Clustering SVM [16], Genetic Algorithms [17], [18], and Rough Sets [19], 
[20], [21]. Future research could investigate the change of feature maps before and after 
denoising by implementing deep learning, and some optimizing methods [1], [11], [12], [14], 
[15] and distributed methods [22] can be used to address the high cost of deep learning models. 
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